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ABSTRACT
Simple legal jobs (such as document coding) are prime candidates for legal automation. 
More complex tasks cannot be routinized.  So far, the debate on the likely scope and 
intensity of legal automation has focused on the degree to which legal tasks are simple or 
complex.  Just as important to the legal profession, however, is the degree of regulation 
or deregulation likely in the future.  
Situations involving conflicting rights, unique fact patterns, and open-ended 
laws will remain excessively difficult to automate for an extended period of time. 
Deregulation, however, may effectively strip many persons of their rights, rendering 
once-hard cases simple.  Similarly, disputes that now seem easy, because one party is 
so clearly in the right, may be rendered hard to automate by new rules that give now-
disadvantaged parties new rights.  By explaining how each of these reversals could arise, 
this Essay combines technical and sociological analyses of the future of legal automation. 
We conclude that the future of artificial intelligence in law is more open ended than 
most commentators suggest.
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INTRODUCTION 
Will software substitute for lawyers, or increase their earning power?  There 
will be evidence of each in coming decades: Routine work will continue to be au-
tomated, while new opportunities will also emerge.  The critical question is 
which trend will be dominant, and what its effect will be. 
Scholars have addressed the automation of legal processes since at least the 
1960s.1  None foresaw all the critical developments of the past two decades and 
detailed prognostication is still a fool’s errand.  Nevertheless, in a time of rapid 
technological change, scenario analysis can help clarify the possibilities ahead.  
This Essay describes four possible future climates for the development of legal 
automation, ranging from a computationally administered “society of control” to 
a muddling continuation of the status quo. 
The future of law and computation is more open ended than most com-
mentators suggest.  By mechanically extrapolating present trends in document 
review into the future, for example, one might expect replacement of lawyers en 
masse by software.  Yet two leading experts on automation say that computeriza-
tion of legal research will complement the work of many lawyers, rather than sub-
stitute for them.2  They categorize the careers of attorneys as having a “low risk” 
of computerization, at least compared with employment generally.3 
This is not to say that law practice has reached some steady state of balance 
between human capital and software.  Rather, the agenda for researchers must 
shift toward direct examination of law’s diverse practice areas and functions.  This 
Essay lays out a research agenda for better-grounded predictions about the future 
course of automation, in areas ranging from business formation and mergers and 
  
1. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 37 (1964). 
2. CARL BENEDIKT FREY & MICHAEL A. OSBORNE, OXFORD MARTIN SCH., THE FUTURE OF 
EMPLOYMENT: HOW SUSCEPTIBLE ARE JOBS TO COMPUTERISATION?, at 41 (Sept. 17, 
2013), http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_Employment 
.pdf.  Frey is an expert in economics and business and Osborne is an expert in robotics.  They 
believe that “for the work of lawyers to be fully automated, engineering bottlenecks to creative and 
social intelligence will need to be overcome . . . .”  Id. 
3. Id. at 37, 41.  See also Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 43 
J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 275 (2014) (“Predictions of structural change in the legal industry date back 
at least to the invention of the typewriter.  Yet lawyers have prospered with the introduction and 
adoption of new technologies and modes of work—computerized and modular legal research 
through Lexis and Westlaw, word processing, citation software, electronic document storage and 
filing systems, automated document comparison, electronic document searching, e-mail, 
photocopying, desktop publishing, standardized legal forms, and will and tax preparation software. 
Although each of these was seen by some as a potentially damaging structural shift in the return to 
law, the law degree still offers a large earnings premium.”) (internal citations omitted).  
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acquisitions, to compliance, to discovery and fact investigation, to litigation, legis-
lation, and regulation. 
While we extend and develop extant debates on the degree of automatability 
of legal tasks, we also acknowledge the sociological and political nature of the dis-
cussion.  Extralegal developments will be crucial in determining the future balance 
of computational and human intelligence in the law.  No profession is an island, 
untouched by the trends in power, wealth, influence and status prevailing in the 
society in which it is embedded.4  During the New Deal and Great Society, the 
importance of lawyers rose as they articulated the reach and limits of new social 
and economic rights.  The Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank Act could 
presage a similar rise in the value of lawyers’ services. 
There are, however, countervailing social forces.  Government employment 
has declined dramatically during the Obama administration, particularly in state 
and local offices.5  Even with their many new powers, regulators are hard-
pressed to increase enforcement intensity without added resources.  A judiciary 
often hostile to regulatory action can slow down or stop major initiatives.6  Most 
importantly, when neoliberal corporations and individuals become wealthy 
enough, they are able to shape a climate of opinion that tends toward the margin-
alization and even trivialization of the type of legal work traditionally considered 
essential to the fair and efficient working of markets, public programs, and society 
in general.  Some vanguardist technologists even dismiss law as an outdated app 
ripe to be replaced by a combination of markets, reputational intermediaries, 
blockchains, and distributed autonomous organizations.7 
To predict the future of legal automation, we take key considerations in-
ternal and external to the legal profession as fundamental variables.  Different 
types of legal work are more or less susceptible to automation.  Society can be 
more or less regulatory and more or less open to procedural protections.  A basic 
schematic emerges: 
 
  
4. See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS 315 (1988); ELIOT FREIDSON, 
PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001). 
5. Floyd Norris, Under Obama, a Record Decline in Government Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012, 
12:53 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/under-obama-a-record-decline-in-
government-jobs. 
6. See, e.g., David Yatte et al.,  D.C. Circuit Vacates FERC Rule on Pricing of Demand Response in 
Organized Energy Markets, VAN NESS FELDMAN (May 27, 2014), http://www.vnf.com/getpdf. 
aspx?show=2909 (showing the impact the D.C. Circuit has on energy regulation).  
7. See, e.g., Mark Wilson, The Latest in 'Technology Will Make Lawyers Obsolete!', FINDLAW (Jan. 6, 
2015, 11:39 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2015/01/the-latest-in-technology-will-
make-lawyers-obsolete.html. 
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We use this schematic as a tool for thinking and as a way of organizing fu-
ture scenarios.8  Abstract trends like automation and regulation can have very 
concrete consequences, as our description of the numbered scenarios above will 
demonstrate. 
The first scenario, a Vestigial Legal Profession, can be expected in legal prac-
tice areas now serving industries that continue to deregulate.  For advocates of dis-
ruptive innovation like Harvard Business School Professor Clayton Christensen, 
that is a consummation devoutly to be wished.  Christensen’s acolytes in the legal 
academy tend to see much of law as little more than a transaction cost imposed on 
job-creating businesses.  From their perspective, automation both reflects and re-
inforces trends toward laissez-faire deregulation.  Simple, precise legal rules are 
easy to automate.  As attorneys’ roles are increasingly taken over by machines, their 
social prestige declines—thus vitiating their ability to propose more complex or 
expansive regulatory regimes.   
But what happens if artificial intelligence and regulation both advance?  This 
scenario portends what French social theorist Gilles Deleuze called a “Society of 
Control;”9 namely, a world in which human action is increasingly managed and 
monitored by machines.10  As Peter Reinhardt recently observed, at firms like Ub-
er and 99designs, “lines of code directly control real humans.”11  In government, 
too, software can effectively make determinations about who will be audited, who 
will receive benefits, or who will be denied access to a flight.12  It is possible to im-
agine whole areas of law relegated to computational implementation.  For exam-
ple, Lawrence Solum has posited (not endorsed) the development of an 
  
8. For methodological precedents, see, for example, Riccardo Campa, Technological Growth and 
Unemployment: A Global Scenario Analysis, 24 J. EVOLUTION & TECH. 86, 89 (2014); see also 
PETER FRASE, FOUR FUTURES (2015) (describing four scenarios based on high or low levels of 
scarcity and hierarchy). 
9. Gilles Deleuze, Postscript on the Societies of Control, 59 OCTOBER 3 (1992), available at https://files. 
nyu.edu/dnm232/public/deleuze_postcript.pdf. 
10. Lawrence B. Solum, Artificial Meaning, 89 WASH. L. REV. 69 (2014). 
11. Peter Reinhardt, Replacing Middle Management With APIs, REINPK, http://rein.pk/replacing-
middle-management-with-apis (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
12. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2008). 
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“Artificially Intelligent Traffic Authority (AITA),” which could “adapt itself to 
changes in driver behavior and traffic flow.”13  The system would be designed to 
“introduce random variations and run controlled experiments to evaluate the ef-
fects of various combinations on traffic pattern.”14  But the system would not be 
very forgiving of individual experimentation with, say, violating its rules.  Rather, 
as imagined by Solum, “[v]iolations would be detected by an elaborate system of 
electronic surveillance” and offenders would be “identified and immediately . . . 
removed from traffic by a system of cranes located at key intersections.”15 
Solum uses this example to break down the usual distinctions between 
human and artificial meaning in the law, rather than as a policy proposal for the 
future of transportation.  The scenario is just as useful to flag the inevitable legal 
and political aspects of automated law enforcement, even in an area as seeming-
ly technical as traffic.  Would the cranes posited in Solum’s hypothetical surgi-
cally remove protesters, like the Ferguson marchers, who blocked highways?16  
Would anyone with an expired license or tags be plucked away as well—in a 
vision already half-realized by subprime lenders who stop cars remotely as soon 
as a payment is late?17 
Both the Vestigial Legal Profession and Society of Control scenarios may 
seem unduly futuristic—and indeed warrant skepticism.  As the third scenario—
Status Quo—suggests, it is entirely possible that legal automation will move for-
ward far more slowly than many predict or expect.  While the legal profession 
may decline in importance (if not in employment levels), it may not be nearly as 
susceptible to automation as other fields.   
By contrast, robust growth in jobs for those with legal training would likely 
occur under a fourth scenario, called the “Second Great Compression.”  Among 
economists, the Great Compression is the period from roughly 1947 to 1979 
when income growth was roughly evenly distributed among quintiles.18  Since 
1979, most income gains have gone to the top quintile, and within that group, 
  
13. Solum, supra note 10, at 75. 
14. Id.  This is an acceleration of processes endorsed in JIM MANZI, UNCONTROLLED: THE 
SURPRISING PAYOFF OF TRIAL-AND-ERROR FOR BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 
(2012).  Acceleration is a key theme in automation, and a social theory of acceleration is needed to 
address rapid automation.  See generally HARTMUT ROSA, SOCIAL ACCELERATION: A NEW 
THEORY OF MODERNITY (2013). 
15. Solum, supra note 10, at 75. 
16. For an account of the importance of protest to civic life, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Political 
Disobedience, in OCCUPY: THREE INQUIRIES IN DISOBEDIENCE 45, 45 (2013). 
17. See Jathan Sadowski & Frank A. Pasquale, Creditors Use New Devices to Put Squeeze on Debtors, 
ALJAZEERA AM. (Nov. 9, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/11/debt-
collection-technologystarterinterruptdevicesubprime.html. 
18. See Claudia Goldin & Robert Margo, The Great Compression: The Wage Structure in the United 
States at Mid-Century, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1, 1 (1992). 
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the top 1 percent (and within that group, the top 0.1 percent).19  Reversing that 
trend toward concentration of income would take very high levels of legal regula-
tion of enterprises, and a rebalancing of the relative power of the state and busi-
ness to favor the enhanced autonomy of the former.  Each trend in the Second 
Great Compression scenario would increase the power (and, likely, the earnings) 
of attorneys. 
By describing these trends in greater detail below, this Essay illuminates 
the relative plausibility of each scenario.  It takes seriously the possibility of both 
self-fulfilling and self-preventing prophecies.  Both Status Quo and Second 
Great Compression are likely to be more humane scenarios than Vestigial Legal 
Profession and Society of Control.  This work is designed to make it more diffi-
cult for key policymakers to accept either of those high-automation scenarios 
uncritically.  And if these substandard scenarios do indeed come to pass, at least 
the profession was warned in advance. 
I. VESTIGIAL LEGAL PROFESSION SCENARIO: HIGH AUTOMATION, 
LOW REGULATION 
The most prominent advocates for legal automation are, at present, 
closely tied to deregulatory or laissez-faire views.20  John O. McGinnis believes 
that machine intelligence will substitute for legal expertise, thereby reducing 
the incomes of many lawyers.21  One of the main reasons he applauds this de-
velopment is because, in his words: 
A decline in the clout of law schools and lawyers could have poten-
tially broader political effects.  For the last half-century, many law 
professors and lawyers have pressed for more government interven-
tion in the economy.  This isn’t surprising.  Lawyers in the modern 
regulatory state reap rewards from big government because their ex-
pertise is needed to understand and comply with (or exploit) compli-
cated and ever-changing rules.  In contrast, the entrepreneurs and 
innovators driving our computational revolution benefit more from a 
stable regulatory regime and limited government.  As they replace 
  
19. Frank Pasquale, Access to Medicine in an Era of Fractal Inequality, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 269, 
275–76 (2010). 
20. See Clay Michael Gillespie, Legal Consulting Firm Believes Artificial Intelligence Could Replace Layers 
by 2030, HACKED (Jan. 2, 2015), https://hacked.com/legal-consulting-firm-believes-artificial-
intelligence-replace-lawyers-2030; Martha Neil, Susskind: Are Lawyers Becoming Obsolete?, ABA J. 
(Oct. 23, 2007, 6:40 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/susskind_are_lawyers_ 
becoming_obselete. 
21. John O. McGinnis, Machines v. Lawyers, CITY J., http://www.city-journal.org/2014/24_2_ 
machines-vs-lawyers.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
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lawyers in influence, they’re likely to shape a politics more friendly to 
markets and less so to regulation.22 
For McGinnis, there is a zero-sum relationship between the clout of inno-
vators and lawyers: as one rises, the other falls.23  The political views of each are 
also easy to map: the technology crowd is libertarian, in favor of limited govern-
ment, while attorneys err on the side of statism, harboring both ideological and 
material biases toward expanding government power. 
Admittedly, McGinnis’s assumptions here may be problematic.  Many of 
the most powerful and well-paid attorneys in the United States operate practices 
that are profoundly deregulatory.24  On the technology side, it is by no means 
clear that its vanguard firms—mainly located in Northern California—are filled 
with libertarians.  Google employees’ political donations have skewed strongly 
Democratic, while tech workers in general do not hew to a single political line.25 
A. Technologies in High-Automation/Low-Regulation Legal Fields 
Still, for the sake of argument, consider a plausible clarification of McGin-
nis’s views: Those at the top of technology firms may well favor deregulation, be-
cause cuts to their legal costs may directly enrich them or their shareholders.  And 
the bulk of lawyers, toiling below the level of partnerships at white-shoe law firms, 
have some interest in maintaining the structures of legislation and regulation that 
are their raison d’etre.  How might venture capitalists and technologists eventually 
fund and develop the tools needed to replace lawyers?  Many technologies have al-
ready been developed in high-automation/low-regulation areas and have had both 
negative and positive impacts on the legal community. 
  
22. Id. 
23. See John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 993–94 (2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2130085. 
24. These attorneys are highly paid not merely for navigating complex legal rules, but for advocacy that 
results in judicial decisions (such as expansive preemption rulings) that end the application of large 
bodies of law to substantial areas of business conduct.  The extraordinary narrowing of the scope of 
antitrust law is also a case in point: a result of highly skilled advocacy by large firms’ attorneys and 
their coadjutants in the legal academy.  See, e.g., BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW 
MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2010); William Davies, 
Economics and the ‘Nonsense’ of Law: The Case of the Chicago Antitrust Revolution, 39 ECON. & 
SOC’Y 64, 65 (2010) (explaining that the Law and Economics School focused competition policy 
on the goal of maximizing a stylized measure of consumer welfare). 
25. David Auerbach, The Silicon Valley-ization of San Francisco, SLATE (Dec. 20, 2013, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/the_next_silicon_valley/2013/12/silicon_valley_s_invasi
on_of_san_francisco_not_quite_the_ayn_rand_nightmare.html. 
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1. eDiscovery  
At least in the field of discovery, some tools such as Relativity, HP Auton-
omy, Merrill, and Stratify have already been developed.  Fewer young associates 
pore over boxes of documents to find mentions of a query term anymore.  EDis-
covery reigns instead.  According to the Sedona Conference, eDiscovery is “the 
process of identifying, preserving, collecting, preparing, reviewing, and produc-
ing electronically stored information . . . .”26  In predictive coding, a document 
reviewer assigns metrics regarding how useful documents and key terms are to a 
case.27  Based on these inputs, predictive coding software locates other docu-
ments within a database that would also likely be useful as evidence in a case.28  
Predictive coding, therefore, decreases the number of documents that need to be 
reviewed manually and can decrease time spent in discovery by 75 percent.29 
2. eResearch and Form Providers 
Similarly, the days of manually “Shephardizing” a case are gone: Citing 
documents appear in online research tools like Westlaw or Lexis, or might even 
be found via a clever Google search.  Apps can now automate basic wills, incorpo-
ration documents, or expungements.  LegalZoom has been able to create legal 
“form-like” documents for quite some time.  Many LLCs have used artificial 
intelligence software for incorporating their businesses.30  Consumer-facing 
providers of automated legal solutions have faced some lawsuits.31  They may be 
  
26. SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. SERIES, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE GLOSSARY: 
E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 18 (Sherry B. Harris ed., 3d ed. 
2010). 
27. See Wallis M. Hampton, Predictive Coding: It’s Here to Stay, PRAC. L. J., May 2014, at 28, available 
at http://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/LIT_JuneJuly14_EDiscoveryBull 
etin.pdf. 
28. See id. 
29. See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE 
MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING 
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 19–20, 21 fig.2.2, 41, 42 fig.4.1 (2012), http://www.rand.org/content 
/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf; Stephanie Wilkins Pugsley, 
eDiscovery: It’s Time to Drop the ‘e’, 27 UTAH B.J., 14 July/Aug. 2014, at 14, 16; Maura R. 
Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More 
Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 48 (2011). 
30. Anthony Ha, LegalZoom Files for $120M IPO, Saw $156M in Revenue Last Year, TECHCRUNCH 
(May 11, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/11/legalzoom-ipo (“[M]ore than 20 percent of 
limited liability companies formed in California did so through LegalZoom.”). 
31. See Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011); In re Boettcher, 262 
B.R. 94 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001); Thomas v. State, 226 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. App. 2007). 
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able to provide help to those seeking simple assistance, but always need to be sen-
sitive to myriad issues that can arise when problems become more complex.32 
B. Impact on Law Firm Revenue  
A Vestigial Legal Profession would reflect larger trends toward inequality 
in the economy.  Those at the bottom of the profession would continue to be 
replaced by machines; those at the top would find software complementing 
their expertise and connections, extending their reach and power.  Similarly, 
the wealthiest firms and persons would find their actions increasingly untouch-
able as various explicit and tacit rules bar legal action against them, or shunt it 
into fast-tracked, low stakes arbitral forums.33  Meanwhile, even if citizens of 
low socioeconomic status are rendered more vulnerable by new legal orders, 
there will be little to win from them. 
A Vestigial Legal Profession scenario would vindicate critics of the legal 
profession who assume that too much of law firms’ work is now routine and 
could be broken down into more efficient processes.34  But assessing the impact 
on revenue from automated form provision requires more data, including, for 
example, the percentage of revenue these firms obtain from this work.  Never-
theless, the hit to revenue might be substantial; the lack of hard data to prove a 
certain level of dependence on such work does not necessarily indicate the lack of 
such dependence. 
Repetitive administrative functions such as document review and filling out 
forms are prime candidates for automation.  Lawyers can farm out tasks, which 
the ABA rules permit as long as a lawyer “supervises” the delegation.35  On the 
other hand, small firms may not be competitive because they end up doing a lot of 
  
32. See Isaac Figueras, Comment, The LegalZoom Identity Crisis: Legal Form Provider or Lawyer in 
Sheep’s Clothing, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1419, 1440 (2013) (“Courts note that LegalZoom can 
offer blank forms and instructions on how to use them, but LegalZoom may need to alter its 
document preparations services, stop offering general guidance on state laws, or remove some of the 
checkpoints where its employees review a customer’s legal document.  Indeed, LegalZoom may 
need to alter its business model to make it more akin to a legal self-help kit than it currently is.  
Otherwise, LegalZoom may suffer from more legal challenges in the future.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
33. See GLENN GREENWALD, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME (2012); see also Marcy 
Wheeler, FBI’s “Rich White Man” Hypocrisy: How New Policy Will Let the 1 Percent Skate Free, 
SALON (Feb. 5, 2015, 1:24 PM), http://www.salon.com/2015/02/05/fbis_rich_white_man_ 
hypocrisy_how_new_policy_will_let_the_1_percent_skate_free (explaining that Section 702’s 
definition of serious crimes does not include white collar crime). 
34. See JERRY VAN HOY, FRANCHISE LAW FIRMS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PERSONAL 
LEGAL SERVICES 40–41 (1997); Ray Worthy Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in 
the U.S. Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 65 (2012). 
35. Campbell, supra note 34, at 41. 
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this work themselves.36  As the number of persons employed as attorneys under 
this scenario diminish, their clout would also fade, starting a self-reinforcing cycle 
of diminishing influence. 
II. SOCIETY OF CONTROL SCENARIO: HIGH AUTOMATION, HIGH 
REGULATION 
McGinnis thus may well be right that a highly automated legal system will 
advance the deregulation of large corporations.  Yet the automation of regulation 
and law enforcement need not go hand-in-hand with deregulation for small 
firms or citizens.  On the contrary, just as ever-cheaper sensors and cameras lead 
to greater opportunities for surveillance, the internet of things and connected de-
vices will also render ever more aspects of daily experience as pressure points for 
regulatory intervention.37  The same technology that allows the government to 
direct deposit income tax returns come tax time may also allow direct debit of 
fines via trips switched by red light cameras. 
The automation of law enforcement is already well documented in many 
fields.  For example, copyright holders have installed multiple layers of content 
control into compact disks, files, platforms, and surveillance systems.  Known as 
“digital rights management,” kludgy versions of this automation might render a 
laptop computer capable of only playing DVDs from Europe if its settings are 
changed too many times.38  More sophisticated surveillance tools can detect pat-
terns of sound and images owned by a copyright holder, and automatically disa-
ble their transmission.  That happened during an awards show broadcasted 
online; when some notes of protected content were scanned by an algorithm, the 
program immediately cut off.39  There are plans to automate terms of service 
  
36. See id. at 34, 52; Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. REV. 
1003, 1007–10 (1994); William D. Henderson, Three Generations of U.S. Lawyers: Generalists, 
Specialists, Project Managers, 70 MD. L. REV. 373, 379–80 (2011); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future 
Role of “Law Workers”: Rethinking the Forms of Legal Practice and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 919–20 (2002). 
37. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, 
Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 92–95 (2014). 
38. See Joseph Esposito, Thinking Through a Strategy for Digital Rights Management, SCHOLARLY 
KITCHEN (Apr. 23, 2012), http://scholarlykitchen.sspnet.org/2012/04/23/thinking-through-a-
strategy-for-digital-rights-management. 
39. See Annalee Newitz, How Copyright Enforcement Robots Killed the Hugo Awards, IO9 (Sept. 3, 2012, 
10:25 AM), http://io9.com/5940036/how-copyright-enforcement-robots-killed-the-hugo-
awards. 
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agreements, so privacy protections effectively “run with the data” as embedded 
code, restricting some uses and permitting others.40 
The state has also outsourced many regulatory and legal decisions to com-
putation.  There are too many tax returns for IRS personnel to examine by hand; 
“audit flags” must be programmed to determine which should get scrutiny, or be 
rejected outright.41  Homeland security officials use big data and algorithms to 
determine who is a security risk, and who can pass unmolested to their flights.42  
Even the humble red light camera is part of the trend, alerting officials to scoff-
laws who illicitly cross intersections.  Predictive policing deploys law enforce-
ment resources before crimes are committed.43  And once criminals are 
convicted, “evidence-based sentencing” may quantify punishment by using data 
and algorithms to adjust sentence length based on myriad factors.44 
More avant-garde proposals would build enforcement regimes into con-
tracts, on the model of “distributed autonomous organizations (DAOs).”45  The 
use of Bitcoin has fueled hopes that “distributed trust networks” could replace 
traditional legal authorities.46  With this model, the fundamental function of de-
termining who owns or owes could be outsourced from persons to the block-
chain, a record of transactions maintained and monitored by a large number of 
engaged observers.47  On the governmental level, libertarian Hans-Hermann 
Hoppe envisioned the rise of government-like organizations (GLOs) to enforce 
  
40. Travis D. Breaux et al., A Distributed Requirements Management Framework for Legal Compliance 
and Accountability, 28 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 8, 9 (2009). 
41. Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1511. 
42. Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1, 67 (2014). 
43. Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 802 
(2013).  But see Michael L. Rich, Limits on the Perfect Preventive State, 46 CONN. L. REV. 883, 883 
(2014). 
44. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2014). 
45. See Primavera De Filippi, Ethereum: Freenet or Skynet?, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & 
SOC’Y HARV. U., https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2014/04/difilippi (last updated 
Jan. 31, 2015); Vitalik Buterin, Superrationality and DAOs, ETHEREUM (Jan. 23, 2015), 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/01/23/superrationality-daos. 
46. Andreas Antonopoulos, Bitcoin Security Model: Trust by Computation, RADAR (Feb. 20, 2014), 
http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/02/bitcoin-security-model-trust-by-computation.html  (“Bitcoin is 
a distributed consensus network that maintains a secure and trusted distributed ledger through a 
process called ‘proof-of-work.’  Bitcoin fundamentally inverts the trust mechanism of a distributed 
system.  Traditionally, as we see in payment and banking systems, trust is achieved through access 
control, by carefully vetting participants and excluding bad actors.  This method of trust requires 
encryption, firewalls, strong authentication and careful vetting.  The network requires investing 
trust in those gaining access.”). 
47. JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, MERCATUS CTR. GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., 
BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS (2013), available at http://mercatus.org/sites/default/ 
files/Brito_BitcoinPrimer_v1.3.pdf.  
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agreements among private parties, with centralized administrations gradually 
falling into desuetude.48 
To assure transparency and predictability, software code may ultimately 
govern such GLOs.  Samir Chopra and Laurence White call these programs “au-
tonomous artificial agents (AAAs)”—agents because they act on behalf of some-
one, artificial because they are not organic persons or animals, and autonomous 
because they can perform actions without checking back in with the person who 
programmed them or set them in motion.49  Mutual (or unanimous) consent of 
those regulated (or governed) by the GLOs would be necessary to alter the code. 
Though some Silicon Valley technology firms may eagerly await the advance 
of both public and private versions of the Society of Control, there are still some 
critical problems to be worked out.  Classic values of administrative procedure, 
such as due process, are not easily coded into software language.50  Many automat-
ed implementations of social welfare programs, ranging from state emergency as-
sistance to Affordable Care Act exchanges, have resulted in erroneous denials of 
benefits, lengthy delays, and troubling outcomes.51  Financial engineers may 
quantify risks in ever more precise ways for compliance purposes, but their models 
have also led to financial instability and even financial crisis.52 
Given the extraordinary returns it has seen over the past few decades, the 
finance sector has been particularly well resourced to deploy automation of com-
pliance and trading—with mixed results.  Even when structured securities, 
parsed by proprietary software, proved good for the firms’ bottom line, they did 
not contribute to overall economic productivity.53 
The most fully automated part of the finance sector—high-frequency 
trading—has generated considerable controversy.54  Algorithmic trading can 
create extraordinary instability and frozen markets when split-second trading 
  
48. HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, DEMOCRACY: THE GOD THAT FAILED (2001). 
49. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS 
ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 9–10 (2011). 
50. Citron, supra note 12, at 1249. 
51. Id. at 1268–69; David A. Super, An Error Message for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/opinion/an-error-message-for-the-poor.html. 
52. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk 
Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 134 (2009). 
53. U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-
FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
54. SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH SPEED TRADERS, AI BANDITS, AND THE THREAT 
TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2012); SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN 
MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL 
STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO (2012). 
Four Futures of Legal Automation 39 
 
 
 
strategies interact in unexpected ways.55  Consider, for instance, the flash crash 
of May 6, 2010, when the stock market lost hundreds of points in a matter of 
minutes.56  In a report on the crash, the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) observed that 
“as liquidity completely evaporated . . . trades [were] executed at irrational pric-
es as low as one penny or as high as $100,000.”57  Traders had programmed 
split-second algorithmic strategies to gain a competitive edge, but soon found 
themselves in the position of a sorcerer’s apprentice, unable to control the tech-
nology they had developed.58  Though prices returned to normal the same day, 
there is no guarantee future markets will be so lucky. 
One of the leading films on artificial intelligence, Fast, Cheap, and Out of 
Control, presented the whimsy of a roboticist who designed bug-like robots.  The 
film’s title suggested an almost inevitable consequence of many forms of automa-
tion: while they could make daily processes faster and cheaper than direct human 
control would allow, they also threaten to go out of control once a critical mass of 
them begins interacting in unpredictable ways.  The paradox of a Society of Con-
trol, already foreshadowed by the flash crash of 2010, is that human beings have 
little clear sense of what rules or patterns of conduct will ultimately develop in 
highly automated environments rife with measures to generate rules and coun-
termeasures to evade them.  The most successful attorneys in this scenario will 
embrace and utilize automation in their practices while identifying problematic 
applications of artificial intelligence to law. 
III. STATUS QUO SCENARIO: LOW AUTOMATION, LOW REGULATION  
Many lawyers spend significant amounts of time doing repetitive work, 
which is usually not the best or most efficient use of an attorney’s talents.  That 
  
55. ARNUK & SALUZZI, supra note 54. 
56. See REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF 
MAY 6, 2010, at 1 (Sept. 30, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/market events-
report.pdf. 
57. Id. at 5. 
58. See id. at 79.  Note also the disastrous $440 million loss of Knight Capital in August 2012 that was 
traced to IT and software issues at the firm that took nearly an hour to fix.  Dan Olds, How One Bad 
Algorithm Cost Traders $440m, REG. (Aug. 3, 2012, 9:32 AM),  http://www.theregister.co.uk/ 
2012/08/03/bad_algorithm_lost_440_million_dollars; Stephanie Ruhle et al., Knight Trading Loss 
Said to Be Linked to Dormant Software, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-14/knight-software.html.  Korean exchanges faced a smaller crash 
in late 2013.  See High Frequency Trading and Predatory Market Making, THEMIS TRADING 1 (Dec. 
2013), http://blog.themistrading.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/RTL-HFT_Bibliography_ 
2013.pdf. 
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may well be taken care of by machines.  The acceleration of automation beyond 
its present level, however, appears doubtful for many reasons.  Combined with 
the general trend of deregulation now afoot in many industries and policy areas, 
stalled automation would result in our Status Quo scenario. 
Why is a continuing, low-automation Status Quo a real possibility?  It is easy 
to overestimate possibilities for technological advance.  Consider, for instance, 
automated form provision and advice in the model of LegalZoom.  This 
cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all approach is dangerous: entirely incorrect forms 
for a client’s particular situation could be used or a resulting contract could be 
unenforceable.  Although some LLCs are relying on LegalZoom to draft their 
legal documents, it can be excessively risky to use LegalZoom for high-stakes 
business deals.  Risk aversion may trump technology diffusion. 
A. eDiscovery Legal Costs. 
The ultimate impact of eDiscovery remains unclear.  While Moore’s Law 
may apply to computation, it does not govern social relations.  Automated meth-
ods have already reduced demand for some legal positions, and may continue to 
do so.  However, one advocate of legal automation also observes that continued 
automation of discovery could “increase profits to high-performing law firms 
and legal product companies engaged in the enterprise.”59  This is in part be-
cause the extensive training requirements for software use and the cost of the 
predictive coding product itself allow top law firms to charge a premium for 
these services.60   
Of course, there will be countervailing pressures from clients.  A number of 
best practices for decreasing eDiscovery costs, which are usually determined by 
the number of gigabytes of data to be mined, have helped reduce costs.61  Still, 
sometimes using these methods can be cost prohibitive and also push the bound-
ary of relevancy.62  Digital records increase the scope of discovery.63  Further-
more, even if eDiscovery on balance shrinks the size of the legal sector, it could 
be cost prohibitive for some clients to provide information in a format necessary 
for automated eDiscovery, especially if a large amount of redactions are required, 
  
59. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction–or–How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start 
Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 945 (2013). 
60. See The E-Discovery Market Is Growing Fast, EDISCOVERY BUS. (Feb. 8, 2013), http://ediscovery 
business.com/the-e-discovery-market-is-growing-fast. 
61. See Pugsley, supra note 29, at 15. 
62. Charles Yablon & Nick Landsman-Roos, Predictive Coding: Emerging Questions and Concerns, 64 
S.C. L. REV. 633, 646 (2013); Katz, supra note 59, at 943. 
63. See Yablon & Landsman-Roos, supra note 62, at 666. 
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as is the case with trade secrets and protected information.64  In particular, eDis-
covery can require significant time during the planning stages, as parties must ne-
gotiate the scope, cost, and amount of materials that will be made available.65  
And if planning is not done correctly, large amounts of data can result in exorbi-
tant eDiscovery costs, as vendors charge per gigabyte of data.66  This vendor 
charging scheme largely suggests that even when doing eDiscovery without out-
side assistance, costs increase proportionally to the size of the electronic data pool 
used.67  The Internet of Things’ ubiquitous sensor networks will be just one of 
many new sources of data poised to increase this burden. 
Compounding the issue, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires parties to provide all “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense.”68  Given this expansive demand, eDiscovery can create new 
opportunities for sanctions or legal malpractice lawsuits.69  For example, in In re 
Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litigation,70 sanctions were imposed be-
cause not all storage that was relevant to discovery was given to the plaintiff.71  
This illustrates failures that can occur when IT and legal departments don’t work 
closely together in eDiscovery matters.  Furthermore, eDiscovery almost always 
requires documents already be stored electronically; otherwise, additional costs 
are associated with converting them into electronically stored information.72  
Because of the sheer amount of unwieldy electronic data produced by most 
businesses, there still are several impediments to radical expansion of auto-
mated eDiscovery. 
B. The Problem of Close Cases   
Artificial intelligence would work best for rule-based law in easy cases.  
Examples of easy cases include those in which damages can be easily calculated, 
  
64. Pugsley, supra note 29, at 15; Jack G. Conrad, E-Discovery Revisited: The Need for Artificial 
Intelligence Beyond Information Retrieval, 18 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 321 (2010). 
65. See Conrad, supra note 64, at 324. 
66. See Pugsley, supra note 29, at 15. 
67. Katz, supra note 59, at 944 (noting that the ubiquitous use of email keeps eDiscovery costs high). 
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
69. Bob Rohlf & Scott Giordano, The Five Pillars of In-House Ediscovery, ACC DOCKET, Dec. 2012, 
at 42; see Dana A. Remus, The Uncertain Promise of Predictive Coding, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1691 
(2014). 
70. 846 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
71. See Rohlf & Giordano, supra note 59, at 42. 
72. Harkabi v. SanDisk Corp. is another eDiscovery sanctions case based on an IT department’s policies 
and inability to find electronically stored information within a reasonable period of time.  275 
F.R.D. 414, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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in which there is precedent on all fours,73 or in which the law is settled and there 
are no outstanding policy or legal questions.  A breach of contract claim with 
damages clearly described in the contract or a typical rear-end collision with only 
body damage to a vehicle would most likely be easy cases.  These easy cases occur 
often, but they are also typically settled quickly outside of court with minimal at-
torney effort, if an attorney is involved at all.74 
One of the biggest issues with pervasively applying artificial intelligence to 
rule-based law would be with edge or corner cases, in which the conduct, on the 
surface, appears contrary to law.75  These are the typical difficult cases, in which 
special facts differentiate the situation from settled law.76  One example would be 
a case where the contract terms are ambiguous for the specific type of breach that 
occurred.  Another example involves emergency conditions that might justify 
certain conduct, or an area of the law, such as cybersecurity, that is still growing 
and is largely unsettled.77 
Conduct that highlights ambiguity in recently passed rule-based law gives 
rise to situations where artificial intelligence tools, like eResearch, could easily 
lead to incorrect results.  These results would be exacerbated by software that was 
not updated when a law changed.  Because law can change either from legislative 
or judicial action, automated software programs are likely to miss at least some 
updates.  The problem becomes even more intractable when one considers the 
varying levels of authority and clarity inherent to the modern administrative 
state’s panoply of legislative rules, interpretive rules, guidances, adjudications, and 
policy statements.  Legislatures cannot possibly think of every possible set of facts 
in which a law might be applied.78  Even in areas of law where it appears that 
rule-based law is ironclad on the surface, it is often difficult to discern what law 
  
73. Orin Kerr, The Origin of “On All Fours”, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 16, 2006, 10:37 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1166587868.shtml (“‘[O]n all fours’ . . . . means that the former case 
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74. Andrea J. Paterson, Fee Agreements: Structuring Alternative Fee Agreements to Enhance Recovery of 
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75. John Sirman, Artificial Intelligence and the Law, 66 TEX. B.J. 17, 17 (2003). 
76. Eric Talley & Drew O’Kane, The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing 
Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 181, 182 
(2012) (“[T]his human element is unavoidable (and even desirable), since the practice of law is in 
many ways the art of navigating between nuanced forms of expression and hard legal outcomes or 
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77. Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2011) 
(noting that only some areas of law are amenable to computer-generated solutions). 
78. But see John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will 
Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3053 
(2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2436937 (showing that a new company, Lex Machina, 
uses historical court data to predict patent litigation outcomes). 
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governs a scenario because of various exceptions that develop in the course of 
administration and enforcement, or in judge-made common law.79  When one 
considers persuasive authority, like dicta and laws that other states have adopted, 
even more complexity is evident, and the need for human (and humane) judg-
ment is imperative.80  Furthermore, limitations in human language and issues 
with drafting conventions create loopholes that could provide clients with excel-
lent defenses81  Because software will likewise be written according to these same 
limitations, there is a significant possibility that software will not discover prob-
lems and opportunities that a prudent attorney would.82 
This problem is exacerbated by limitations in software: (1) it cannot predict 
the infinite fact patterns that occur in difficult cases that are typically litigated; (2) 
because machine learning is largely based on pattern recognition, it is likely to pro-
vide the easy solution associated with a similar easy case, while unable to replicate 
common sense judgments regarding important loopholes and policy concerns 
that apply to more specific fact patterns associated with substantially more diffi-
cult cases; and (3) if non-attorney clients were to use the software, they would also 
likely not include important, key facts that might change the application of a rigid 
law in a particular circumstance.  This limiting user interface, which would be the 
most likely artificial intelligence solution, could make the odds for the client even 
worse.83  For example, a client might settle based on a software program’s advice 
even though contract terms were ambiguous or unconscionable, not knowing that 
a court would not have upheld them.  Furthermore, someone without a legal 
  
79. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578–79 (1988) (“[T]he 
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80. See L. Karl Branting, A Reduction-Graph Model of Precedent in Legal Analysis, 150 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 59, 64 (2003). 
81. See id.; Ronald E. Wheeler, Does WestlawNext Really Change Everything? The Implications of 
WestlawNext on Legal Research, 103 L. LIBR. J. 359, 366 (2011) (describing the downside of search 
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edge research). 
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83. See Steven Levy, The AI Revolution Is on, WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired. 
com/magazine/2010/12/ff_ai_essay_airevolution; FREY & OSBORNE, supra note 2; Marcello Ceci 
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background is unlikely to recognize that there was not a formal offer and ac-
ceptance in a contract and incorrectly answer the software program questions re-
garding offer and acceptance in the affirmative.84 
It may be difficult for artificial intelligence to replicate a lawyer’s efforts to 
parse analogies.85  The importance of each word or phrase to arguments and the 
lengthy, difficult language in statutes and court opinions defies easy translation 
into algorithms.86 
Attorneys almost always search for analogies during standard legal research.  
By doing so, they can discover cases in which a court held a particular rule applied 
in situations that could be analogized to a client’s scenario, even when facts are 
not on all fours with precedent.87  Natural language recognition software, like Siri 
and Watson, could guard against ambiguity by prompting specific questions that 
could be relevant to the outcome of the case.  But, because fact patterns are so in-
dividualized and specific, it would be impossible to customize follow-up ques-
tions to account for all possible scenarios.88  These hard cases, ones that do not 
occur regularly and are generally not predictable, are the usual cases in which cli-
ents now decide to consult with an attorney.89  For easy cases that occur regularly, 
like a standard rear-end collision with no personal injury, people usually settle 
without attorneys.   
Moreover, it is questionable whether many in the group that consulted an 
attorney for routine easy cases would change their behavior and decide not to 
consult an attorney if artificial intelligence were available.  Ultimately, in order to 
figure out how artificial intelligence will impact the legal profession, it is neces-
sary to determine what percentage of attorney revenue comes from routine easy 
cases where artificial intelligence would be most useful.  It is important to com-
pare easy case revenue with that from difficult, unsettled law.  Given that easy cas-
es should not require a significant amount of attorney time, it is expected that 
these cases should generate the lowest amount of money per case.  Also, easy 
  
84. See, e.g., Adam Zacary Wyner, Weaving the Legal Semantic Web With Natural Language Processing, 
VOXPOPULII (May 17, 2010), http://blog.law.cornell.edu/voxpop/tag/general-architecture-for-
text-engineering/ (describing the complexity of making natural language machine readable for legal 
purposes, and discussing the use of GATE—general architecture for text engineering—to make it 
easier to search large databases for legal professionals, not for laypersons).  
85. Sirman, supra note 75, at 17. 
86. Filippo Galgani et al., HAUSS: Incrementally Building a Summarizer Combining Multiple 
Techniques, 72 INT’L J. HUM.-COMPUTER STUD. 584, 586 (2014). 
87. See Sirman, supra note 75, at 17. 
88. Darla Jackson, Watson, Answer Me This: Will You Make Librarians Obsolete or Can I Use Free and 
Open Source Software and Cloud Computing to Ensure a Bright Future?, 103 L. LIBR. J. 497 (2011). 
89. See Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Brüninghaus, Computer Models for Legal Prediction, 46 
JURIMETRICS 309 (2006). 
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cases that settle quickly often do not involve as large sums of money as more 
difficult cases.  In short: We should not presume that eDiscovery successes can 
be easily extrapolated to the myriad other tasks attorneys perform. 
C. Inability to Emulate Human Creativity 
Finally, artificial intelligence will struggle to emulate human creativity, 
which is subjective and hard to measure.  One of the more viable areas of artificial 
intelligence that McGinnis focuses on is legal search, such as eResearch.90  These 
natural language eResearch solutions will likely provide a first-order approxima-
tion that would be correct in many situations, but could lead to significant errors 
in many others.91  Artificial intelligence is likely to also miss out on essential poli-
cy questions that could be controlling in a case—for instance, for certain admin-
istrability, efficiency, or fairness reasons, the rigid rule should not apply to a 
specific set of facts.92  The fact that computers are unlikely to identify that a law’s 
application should be limited and that artificial intelligence has specific problems 
in skills requiring manipulation, creativity, and social intelligence highlight these 
issues.93  Furthermore, while leading advocates of legal automation focus on legal 
search, discovery, document generation, and predicting case outcomes, they fail 
to address what percentage of overall attorney income is based on these activi-
ties.94  Another important source of attorney revenue is associated with providing 
expert advice, investigating facts, organizing materials, and applying facts to 
law.95  There is no clear computational replacement for many of these activities 
on the horizon—particularly in complex and fast-changing areas of law, legisla-
tion, and policy. 
IV. SECOND GREAT COMPRESSION SCENARIO: LOW AUTOMATION, 
HIGH REGULATION 
What will be the future for the legal profession if the challenges to automa-
tion in our Status Quo scenario persist, and regulation increases, rather than de-
creases?  Retarding automation that controls, stigmatizes, cheats innocent 
  
90. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 78, at 3048. 
91. See FREY & OSBORNE, supra note 2, at 40. 
92. See Adam Zachary Wyner, Weaving the Legal Semantic Web With Natural Language Processing, 
VOXPOPULII (May 17, 2010), http://blog.law.cornell.edu/voxpop/tag/general-architecture-for-
text-engineering. 
93. See FREY & OSBORNE, supra note 2, at 40; McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 78, at 3050. 
94. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 78, at 3046. 
95. See id. 
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people, or sets up arms races with zero productive gains, should be a much bigger 
part of public discussions regarding the role of machines and software in ordering 
human affairs.  If such discussions lead to new policy, society might see a fourth 
scenario, here described as the Second Great Compression. 
The first great compression involved the reduction in inequality, between 
1947 and 1979, as workers demanded more compensation for their labor, and 
capital received commensurately less of national income.96  (This trend reversed 
from 1979 to the present, as capital became more dominant.)97 
The question now is whether law will be turned toward more egalitarian 
ends.  Much of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Affordable Care Act could be inter-
preted as a renewal of American society’s egalitarian aims.98  Lawyers will need to 
be a large part of these efforts, parsing complex regulations on, inter alia, proprie-
tary trading, risk adjustment in insurance markets, and the scope of professional 
practice in rapidly changing finance and health sectors.  Policymakers may well 
decide that human judgment is critical to each of those tasks.  And they may 
refocus the goal of automation to help stabilize and cheapen the supply of ne-
cessities, such as transportation, energy, food, and manufactured goods. 
That possibility may strike some as excessively dirigiste.  But each of the 
prior alternatives discussed above has its own elements of central planning, 
whether by private or government actors.  All too often, the automation litera-
ture is focused on replacing humans, rather than respecting their hopes, duties, 
and aspirations.  A central task of educators, managers, and business leaders 
should be finding ways to complement a workforce’s existing skills, rather than 
sweeping that workforce aside.99  That does not simply mean creating workers 
with skill sets that better plug into the needs of machines.  It also means doing 
the opposite: creating machines that better enhance and respect the abilities and 
needs of workers.  That would be a “machine age” welcoming for all, rather than 
one calibrated to reflect and extend the power of machine owners. 
As one of us has shown in prior work, a great deal of inequality can be ex-
plained by the dismantling or subversion of laws designed to maintain corporate 
responsibility and the obligations of all the wealthy to pay taxes due under law.100  
  
96. See Goldin & Margo, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that “compression” refers to the narrowing of 
most incomes: there are fewer billionaires, but also fewer impoverished persons). 
97. See id. 
98. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641 (2012) 
(regulating certain banking practices); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
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Ideological movements designed to shut the courthouse door to the injured have 
been funded exceedingly well by their corporate benefactors. A self-reinforcing 
cycle of corporate influence over legislation and its interpretation, leading to 
higher profits, leading to more resources to assert corporate influence, explains 
many of the economic difficulties faced by plaintiffs’ attorneys in fields like en-
vironmental law and consumer protection law. It also reduces the demand for 
defense-side attorneys.  
A reversal of that cycle—reasserting environmental and other standards, 
winning real compensation for the victims of corporate misbehavior (and fees for 
their attorneys), could provide the resources for countervailing powers in both 
federal and state politics. It would also create more demand for legal services 
among many citizens who have now given up hope of obtaining compensation 
for wrongs they have suffered. 
Of course, there are also visions of social justice achievable without a great 
deal of regulation and legal enforcement. A universal basic income might render 
many disability or welfare attorneys superfluous; a single-payer healthcare pro-
gram might reduce the employability of health lawyers.101  But political realists in 
both parties are quick to declare the extreme unlikelihood of either option. Given 
their power, routes to a more egalitarian social order in the United States may 
well continue to require the intensive labor of legal professionals.102 
CONCLUSION 
Simple legal jobs (such as document coding) are prime candidates for legal 
automation.  More complex tasks cannot be easily routinized.  So far, the debate 
on the likely scope and intensity of legal automation has focused on the degree to 
which legal tasks are simple or complex. Just as important to the future of the legal 
profession, however, is the degree of regulation or deregulation likely in the future. 
Situations involving conflicting rights, unique fact patterns, and open-ended 
laws will likely remain excessively difficult to automate for an extended period of 
time.  Deregulation may, however, effectively strip many persons of their rights 
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everything from the welfare state to environmental regulation, America has chosen more indirect 
and incoherent policy mechanisms than any comparable country.”).  
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and render once-hard cases simple.  Consider, for instance, the trend in contract 
law to permit individuals to give up their right to join class actions, or even 
seek recourse in a court, via terms of service agreements that almost no con-
sumer actually reads.  A robot could dispose of nearly all cases arising in the 
wake of such agreements, if the only legal issue critical for the vast majority of 
consumers was whether they had “agreed.”  Once the law and fact of consent 
in such situations are settled, the outcomes are entirely predictable. 
On the other hand, disputes that now seem easy, because one party is so 
clearly correct as a matter of law, may be rendered hard to automate by new 
rules that give now-disadvantaged parties new rights.  For example, a person in 
the United States cannot sue Google for automatically putting a 20-year-old 
bankruptcy action against him as the top result in a search for his name.  In Eu-
rope, however, the opposite is the case: A newly recognized “right to be forgotten” 
(better named the “right to be delisted”) gives persons the chance to challenge the 
inclusion of certain irrelevant, damaging material from such results.103  This deci-
sion realizes the basic principles behind expungement law in the digital age.  It also 
creates new work for attorneys and policy advisors seeking to balance the public 
right to know against individual rights of privacy and reputational integrity. 
Thus, legal and cultural change can render once contestable disputes essen-
tially automatable, and can also render once automatically resolved disputes open 
to new levels of contestation.  By explaining in general terms how each of these 
reversals could arise, this Essay combines technical and sociological analyses of 
four distinct climates for the future of legal automation.  We hope the scenarios 
we have described have demonstrated that the future of law and computation 
hinges on broader social trends outside of law, and thus is far more open ended 
than most commentators now suggest. 
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